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Abstract
As the return to education (and possibly also parental income) is un-
certain, and given that the work a child does covertly for his own parents,
and transfers between parents and children, are private information, the
government should make school enrollment compulsory, set a legal limit
(decreasing in parental income) on overt child labour, and redistribute
across families using a ￿ at-rate education grant, and a tax on parental in-
come. That done, it should use a scholarship increasing in school results,
and a tax on the skill premium, to raise the expected return to educational
investment, and make it less uncertain.
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1 Introduction
Developing country governments and international development agencies have
come to realize that human, rather than physical, capital accumulation is the
mainspring of economic progress. At the same time, the international commu-
nity is putting pressure on poor countries to curb child labour for humanitarian
reasons. This raises three issues. The ￿rst is that, in a poor developing coun-
try, the e¢ cient level of child labour is unlikely to be zero. The second is
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1that, realistically assuming imperfect credit and insurance markets, and given
the impossibility of a legally binding contract between parents and school-age
children,1 parental investment in their children￿ s education may be ine¢ ciently
low, and child labour ine¢ ciently high. Baland and Robinson (2000) show that
child labour will be ine¢ ciently high if parents are credit rationed, or bequests
constrained to be zero (in other words, if parents would like to leave negative
bequests or, more generally, make negative transfers to their grown-up children,
but have no legal means to do so). Pouliot (2006) shows that, if parents cannot
insure against the risk of a low return to their educational investments, child
labour will be ine¢ ciently high even if borrowing and bequests are interior.
The third issue is one of observability. A very large part of the work children
do takes place outside the market, and is private information.2 A very small
(but never small enough) proportion of this work involves physically or morally
damaging activities. These are the "worst forms" of child labour, which na-
tional governments are committed by international treaty to eradicate. The
rest, the great bulk of it, consists of activities (helping in the home, working in
the family business) conducted for and under the supervision of the children￿ s
own parents.3 While relatively harmless in themselves, these activities con￿ ict
with education,4 and have thus an opportunity-cost in terms of forgone future
earnings. As these activities are not observable by the government, however,
they cannot be regulated.
Something similar may be said about education. School enrollment is com-
mon knowledge, but the total amount of time a child spends actually studying
is not, because this total includes not only school attendance, but also time
spent doing her homework, which is private information. The problem with
regulating study time is only partly related to the observability of study time
itself. If a child goes to sleep during lessons, the time he is asleep cannot be
counted as e⁄ective study time. A teacher will notice if a child is prone to
falling asleep. She will know also if a child is frequently absent (may be on
grounds of actual or alleged ill health), or does not do his homework, and may
take all this as evidence that the child does a substantial amount of work when
he is not at school. If this work is private information, however, there is little
she, or the government, can do about it. Therefore, a government may make
school enrollment compulsory, but cannot oblige a child to study for any spec-
i￿ed amount of time. A way round the problem is o⁄ered by schemes (like
PROGRESA) which e⁄ectively pay children to attend school. As the payment
is contingent on attendance, not on total study time, however, that is only a
partial solution to the problem (we will show that the payment must depend,
at least in part, on veri￿able scholastic performance). Besides, as these schemes
1Cigno (2006) shows, however, that a self-enforcing, renegotiation-proof family constitution
will serve the same purpose.
2One can get statistical estimates of it through household surveys, but the information
cannot be used for regulatory purposes.
3See Cigno and Rosati (2005).
4That is a simpli￿cation. In developing countries, a large fraction of school-age children is
reported by household surveys as neither working nor attending school; see Cigno and Rosati
(2005) for estimates and explanations.
2are not self-￿nancing, they can only last as long as the general tax payer, and
the international community, are willing to pay for them. Therefore, they are
probably the best answer in a crisis situation, where a large number of children
in a particular area is at risk of engaging in the worst forms of child labour, but
cannot be extended to all children in the appropriate age range, and cannot last
for ever.
The present paper sets out to derive the second-best policy, and to compare
it with two benchmarks, a low one, represented by laissez faire, and a high
one, represented by the ￿rst-best policy. We take the return to educational
investment to be uncertain, either because, as in Levhari and Weiss (1974), a
child￿ s learning ability is fully revealed only after the investment is made, or
because, as in Razin (1976), the rental price of the human capital accumulated
through education is not known in advance. Parental income (family income
net of the children￿ s contribution) also may be uncertain, and the child labour
repercussions of this uncertainty have received some attention in the empirical
literature. As the results of introducing this second layer of uncertainty in the
model makes little di⁄erence to the analytical results, however, we will only
discuss the implications informally. We will assume that parents can neither
insure, nor borrow against the expected return to their educational investment.
Assuming that parents have no informational advantage over the government
where this return is concerned,5 however, there is no adverse selection problem.
There is a moral hazard problem, on the other hand, because covert child labour,
total study time, and transfers between parents and children, are private infor-
mation. As the worst forms of child labour raise moral issues that transcend
the materialistic calculations underlying the present paper,6 we abstract from
them. As the implications of an educational externality are well understood,7
we abstract from that too (but we will ￿nd that the policy itself gives rise to a
￿scal externality).
The policy optimization has an optimal taxation (or principal-agent) format.
As we are talking of a poor developing country, school-age realistically means 5-6
to 11-12. It thus seems reasonable to assume that school-age children are under
parental control, and thus that the agents are the parents of these children.
In the logic of this type of problem, if an action is private information, the
government must give agents the incentive to undertake it at the socially optimal
(second-best) level. If an action is common knowledge, however, it does not
make sense for the government to o⁄er costly incentives, because the same result
can be costlessly achieved by threatening the agents with a su¢ ciently severe
penalty.8 In our context, the actions falling into the ￿rst category are parental
5A child￿ s learning ability is objectively revealed by education results, which are common
knowledge. If there is any informational asymmetry, it will then be about the future state of
the labour market. If that is the case, however, the informational advantage will rest with the
government, not with the parents.
6But, see Dessy and Pallage (2005) for a strictly economic analysis.
7See, for example, Hanushek et al. (2003)
8In principal-agent language, this is called a ￿forcing contract￿. For a survey of the ways
in which optimal taxation, or principal-agent, concepts are used in a family policy context,
see Cigno (2009).
3transfers, covert child labour, and the amount of time a child spends studying.
Those falling into the second are overt child labour, and school enrollment.
Section 2 of the paper sets out the basic assumptions regarding parents and
children, and characterizes parental decisions. Section 3 examines the laissez
faire equilibrium. Section 4 derives the ￿rst and second best policy. Section
5 examines the relevant evidence, and discusses the implications of introducing
uncertainty about parental income, and aggregate risks. Section 6 discusses the
policy results, and concludes.
2 Families
There is a large number of families, labelled i = 1;2:::n. Each family consists
of a couple of adults, and one child. Neither the parents, nor the children, have
access to credit and insurance markets. For brevity, we will refer to the child in
the ith family as i. There are two periods, labelled t = 1;2. Parents are alive
only in the ￿rst period. Children are alive in both periods. In period 1, i is
of school age. If she enrolls for school, she will divide her time between study,
paid work in the child labour market, and unpaid work for her parents. If she
does not enroll, she will divide her time between the two forms of work. The
government observes whether i is or is not enrolled at school, and how much
time she spends working in the labour market ("overt child labour"), but does
not how much time she spends working for her parents ("covert child labour")
, or actually studying. In period 2, i will be of working age, and work in the
adult labour market.9
Ex post, i￿ s utility will be given by
Ui = u(ci1) + u(ci2);
where ci
t denotes i￿ s consumption in period t. As this utility depends only
on consumption, and not on time allocation, we are implicitly assuming that
leisure is not a good, and that work does not yield direct disutility. The ￿rst
assumption may be justi￿ed by saying that, at very low levels of income, the
marginal utility of leisure is low too. The second is justi￿ed only because we are
disregarding the worst forms of child labour. Assuming descending altruism,
the ex-post utility of i￿ s parents may written as
Vi = v(ai) + ￿Ui; 0 < ￿ < 1;
where ai denotes parental consumption. The functions u(:) and v (:) are as-
sumed increasing and concave, with u0 (0) = v0 (0) = 1. The ￿rst assumption
implies risk aversion, the second that subsistence consumption is normalized to
zero. The constant ￿ is a measure of altruism. The income i￿ s parents would
9Alternatively, he may decide to continue the family business inherited from his parents.
Realistically assuming wage ￿exibility (remember that we are talking of a poor country),
however, his marginal product as a self-employed worker will be equated to his wage rate as
a dependent worker.
4produce, in period 1, if i studied full time is denoted by yi. We assume that
this income varies across families, but is exogenously given for each particular
i. Later in the paper, we will see what happens if yi is a random variable.
We further assume that i￿ s time endowment, normalized to unity in each
period, is entirely absorbed by study and work in period 1,10 and by work in
period 2. The amount of time i spends studying, denoted by ei, includes not
only school attendance, but also homework. If i works in the child labour market
for Li units of time, he earns w1Li, where w1 is the child wage rate. The amount
of time he works for his parents is then (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li).11 The amount of income
she directly or indirectly generates in this way is z (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li), where z (:)
is a revenue function, increasing and concave, with z (0) = 0. Concavity is a
re￿ ection of increasing child fatigue and, if the work activity uses a ￿xed factor
as in the case of farming, also of diminishing marginal productivity. In period
1, i receives two transfers, mi from her parents, and ￿i from the government.
Both transfers may be positive, negative or zero.
Let p denote the price of school enrollment, equal to the average total cost of
tuition (later in the paper, we will consider the possibility of a price subsidy). If
i does not enroll, ei cannot be anything other than zero. In period 2, i will then
earn the unskilled adult wage, w2. If she enrolls at school, by contrast, ei may
be positive. At date 2, i will then earn w2 + xi ￿ ￿i, where xi is an individual
skill premium, and ￿i a transfer (positive, negative or zero) to the government.
While w1 and w2 are certain, and the same for everybody, xi is neither of these
things. As xi is revealed only in period 2, while ei must be chosen in period 1,
education is a risky investment. Anticipating a result that will obtain in Section
4, we take ￿i to be independent of Li, and ￿i to be contingent on xi. Parents
take their decisions in period 1, after the government has announced its policy.
For the moment, we will assume that xi is i.i.d. over the closed interval
[0;x] 2 R+ with density f (:jei) conditional on ei, and f (:j0) = 0. The i.i.d.
assumption, to be relaxed later in the paper, implies that the uncertainty sur-
rounding xi may arise from imperfect information about i￿ s learning ability, or
about the timing of the job o⁄ers i will receive after leaving school, but not
from aggregate shocks. To simplify the notation, we use xi to measure the ￿nal
school result as well as the skill premium. This implies that the only source of
uncertainty is actually the child￿ s learning ability. But, using a random variable
with density conditional on study time to represent the school result, and an-
other random variable with density conditional on the school result to represent
10That is only a convenient simpli￿cation. In many developing countries, a substantial
minority of school-age children is reported as neither working nor studying. But this can be
explained, without putting leisure in the utility function, by allowing for the existence of ￿xed
costs of access to work and school; see Cigno and Rosati (2005).
11Especially if the child is female, this unpaid work may consist of replacing her parents
(typically her mother) in the performance of domestic chores, and thus allowing them to
spend more time generating income. If the child is male, however, this work is more likely
to involve direct participation in an income generating activity run by the family, such as
farming, retailing, or joining with his parents in seasonal plantation work (which, in some
countries, typically means that the whole family has to move temporarily to a place a long
way away from home, and consequently also from school).
5the skill premium, would make no di⁄erence of substance to our results so long
both variables are i.i.d., as we assuming for the moment (and, of course, the skill
premium is not conditional also on some decision variable). The cumulative dis-
tribution of xi, F (xijei), associated with a higher ei, ￿rst-order stochastically
dominates the one associated with a lower ei,
Fei (xijei) ￿ 0: (1)
In other words, the more i studies, the more of a chance she has of getting
good marks, and thus of attracting a high skill premium. For each ei, there
will be values of xi such that (1) holds as an inequality. We impose the stan-
dard convexity-of-distribution-function (CDF), and monotone-likelihood-ratio




is convex in ei, and
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f(xijei) increasing in xi.
















where vi ￿ v(yi + zi ￿ mi), zi ￿ z (1 ￿ Li ￿ ei), ui1 ￿ u(mi + w1Li + ￿i ￿ p),
ui2 ￿ u(w2 + xi ￿ ￿i) and fi ￿ f (xijei), subject to




















i1 = 0: (5)
If i does not enroll, i￿ s parents will choose (Li;mi) so as to maximize
V (Li;mi) ￿ v(yi + z (1 ￿ Li) ￿ mi) + ￿ [u(mi + w1Li) + u(w2)];
subject to (2). The ￿rst-order conditions are then just (3) and (5), with p ￿
ei ￿ 0.
3 Laissez faire
In laissez faire, school enrollment is not compulsory, Li is not regulated, and
￿i ￿ ￿
i ￿ 0:
The pay-o⁄ of enrolling i at school is then





, s.t. (2): (6)
6That of not enrolling her is
￿W (yi) ￿ max
(Li;mi)
V (Li;mi); s.t. (2): (7)
The child will be enrolled if and only if ￿S (yi;p) is at least as large as
￿W (yi). There will then be a threshold value of yi, e y, de￿ned by
￿S (e y;p) = ￿W(e y);
below which i is not enrolled. As e y is the same for every i, because the expected
return to education is the same for all of them, if any children do not get an
education, it will then be those whose parents have a low income. This result
di⁄ers from the one in Ranjan (2001), where a child￿ s learning ability is assumed
to be directly observable (hence, certain), and the threshold is consequently
lower for parents of high-ability, than for parents of low-ability children.
If (2) is not binding, and irrespective of whether yi is or is not high enough
for i to be enrolled at school, (3) and (5) imply
z0
i = w1: (8)
The amount of work i does for her parents is then independent of yi. For yi no
lower than e y, ei will then be increasing, and Li decreasing, in yi. For yi lower
than e y, ei will be zero, and Li constant. By contrast, if (2) is binding, Li is
zero. For yi no lower than e y, ei will then be increasing, and (1 ￿ ei) consequently
decreasing, in yi. For yi lower than e y, ei will be constant.
If parents could trade in perfect credit and insurance markets, the laissez-
faire level of ei would be independent of yi. Then, as the expected return to
education is the same for every i, either all children would be enrolled at school,
or none would. Say that they all would (in other words, that the expected return
is su¢ ciently high to justify borrowing and buying insurance). Having assumed
that parents can neither borrow nor buy insurance, however, educational in-
vestment without government intervention will be ine¢ ciently low. As pointed
out in Lowry (1981), it would be so even if credit were not rationed. For the
investment to be e¢ cient, parents must also be able to buy insurance or, failing
that, reduce risk by somehow imposing on their children to redistribute income
among themselves (and thus, if the redistribution is to be a private family a⁄air,
that the parents have many children).
Proposition 1. In laissez faire, study time is ine¢ ciently low. In very
poor families, children are not even enrolled at school. In less poor
ones, study time increases with parental income.
4 Government






7Unlike parents, the government is free to borrow or lend in the international
credit market. As parents and children are many, and having assumed that
risks are uncorrelated, the government does not face any uncertainty about its
tax revenue. Assuming that the expected return is su¢ ciently high for e¢ ciency
to require educational investment, the government will then make school enroll-
ment compulsory. Making the usual "small country" assumption, we will treat
the real interest rate as a constant, and normalize it to zero. As the optimiza-
tion can determine only relative tax rates, we will normalize the one implicit in
w2 to zero (and thus avoid having the account for the revenue).
As it does not face any budget uncertainty, the government will then choose ￿
ei;Li;mi;￿i;￿
i￿
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, and not also on any
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ej;mj;xj;yj￿
, j 6= i.
4.1 First best
In ￿rst best, all parental decisions are common knowledge. In addition to making
school enrollment compulsory, the government will then prescribe (ei;Li;mi),
and design personalized lump-sum transfers (￿i;￿i) for each i, to re-distribute
and insure. As the maximization of (9) is subject only to (2) and (10), and








eidxi = 0; (11)
￿u0
i1 ￿ ￿ = 0 (12)
and, for each possible realization of xi,
￿(￿u0
i2 ￿ ￿)fi = 0: (13)
As in laissez faire, either Li is zero, or (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li) is determined by (8).
The ￿rst-order condition on ei is not the same as in laissez faire, however,
because the marginal opportunity-cost to i￿ s parents, v0
iz0
i, is equated not to the
expected marginal bene￿t for the parents themselves, ￿
R
xi ui2fi
eidxi, but to the
sum of this private bene￿t, and the ￿scal externality represented by the expected




In view of (5), (12) and (13), it is clear that
ai = aFB; ci1 = ci2 = cFB and mi = mFB:
8As this implies that parental income is equalized across families, and given that
all children are ex-ante identical, the ￿rst-best level of ei is then the same for
every i,
ei = eFB;
and larger than in laissez faire. But there is nothing to tell us that eFB will be
equal to unity. In other words, even an all-seeing and all-powerful government
might not want to do away with child work altogether.
Proposition 2. In ￿rst best,
(i) all school-age children attend school, and divide their time be-
tween study and work in the same way;
(ii) each school-age child studies more than in laissez faire, but not
necessarily full time;
(iii) the government uses lump-sum taxes and subsidies to achieve
perfect equity, full insurance, and perfect consumption smoothing.
4.2 Second best
In second best, (ei;mi) is private information. The government will then make
school enrollment compulsory, ￿x Li, and announce how ￿i and ￿i will be related
to the information available at the relevant time. As ￿i is payable in period 1, it
can depend only on (Li;yi). As ￿i is payable in period 2, it can depend also on
xi. If it seems odd that a benevolent government might actually oblige children
to do a certain amount of paid work, think of the second-best Li as a legal
maximum.
Because of the potential moral hazard problem, the maximization of (9) is
subject not only to (2) and (10), but also to the incentive-compatibility con-
straints (4) and (5). Denoting by  i the Lagrange-multiplier of (2), by ￿i that
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i = 0; (16)
￿ (u0
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i1) ￿ ￿ = 0 (17)







i2 + ￿fi = 0: (18)
Let us start by characterizing the second-best (￿i;￿i;Li). Using (5), we can
re-write (17) as











is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. So long as this is non-
increasing, and given that v0
i is decreasing in yi, we can then write
￿i = ￿ (yi); ￿0 < 0: (19)














fi is increasing in xi, and u0
i2 in ￿i, we can then write
￿i = ￿(xi); ￿
0 > 0: (20)
As there is nothing to prevent ￿i from falling below zero for yi su¢ ciently
small, we can think of this period-1 government transfer as the di⁄erence be-
tween a ￿ at-rate education grant, and a tax increasing in parental income. As
it does not depend on Li, ￿i is neither a tax nor a subsidy on overt child labour.
The intuitive explanation is that Li is ￿xed by the government. Irrespective of
whether Li is zero or positive, the tax or subsidy would then be a lump-sum
transfer. As this would be subtracted from, or added to, ￿i, it would then have
no e⁄ect. If it is positive, the tax would be a lump-sum payment. By a similar
argument, there would be no point in using a price subsidy to push p below
the average total cost of tuition. As there is nothing to stop ￿i being negative
for xi su¢ ciently small, we can similarly think of this period-2 transfer as the
di⁄erence between a tax increasing in the individual skill premium, and a schol-
arship increasing in the ￿nal school result. Stepping outside the formal model
for a moment, we can think of the scholarship as being paid "at the beginning"
of period 2 (the end of period 1), when the ￿nal school result is revealed,12,
and of the tax as being collected "in the course" of period 2, as the skill pre-
mium gradually unfolds. Having established that ￿ (:) is a decreasing function,
and ￿(:) an increasing one, it is clear that the policy redistributes from rich to
poor parents, and insures them against the risk of a low return to their educa-
tional investments, as in ￿rst best. Comparing (17) with (12), and (18) with
(13), however, it is also clear that the policy does not go as far as in ￿rst best.
The intuition is, of course, that the government must now limit its recourse to
distortionary policy instruments.














dxi = 0 (21)
12If partial results are available in the course of period 1, the child could receive partial





i1 = 0: (22)
Substituting from (22), and using (5), (14) in turn simpli￿es to
either z0
i = w1 ￿ ￿iz00
i or Li = 0: (23)
If w1 is su¢ ciently low, Li is then zero. Otherwise, (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li) will be lower
than in either laissez faire or ￿rst best, and decreasing in yi (because ￿i is).
Either way,
z0
i > w1: (24)
We now go on to characterize the second-best (ei;mi). We can see from (21) ￿
(22) that study time and parental transfers are not equalized across families.
Having found that period-1 redistribution does not go as far as in ￿rst best, that
is hardly surprising. This is as far as the government￿ s ￿rst-order conditions will
carry us, but we can go a little further by a di⁄erent route.
Given the policy, (ei;mi) is determined by (4) ￿ (5). Taking the total dif-
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the expected marginal utility of ei.
It is clear from (25) ￿ (26) that i￿ s parents regard ￿i as a transfer to them-
selves, and will thus raise or lower ei according to whether ￿i is positive or
negative (relaxes or tightens the credit constraint). Let us see if that helps us
to deduce what the policy does for educational investment. On the one hand,
as ￿ (:) is decreasing in yi, the policy then encourages educational investment
more in poor than in rich families; in very rich ones, it may actually discourage
investment. On the other hand, as ￿(:) is decreasing in xi, the policy makes
education less risky for all parents. All families, except perhaps the very rich
ones, will then invest more in their children￿ s education than they would in
11laissez faire, and the increase will be larger in poor than in rich families. In this
respect too, disparities will then be smaller than in laissez faire, but we cannot
be sure that they will disappear altogether. Unless it is zero for all families, Li
is decreasing in yi.
Proposition 3. In second best,
(i) all school-age children enroll for school, and all of them, with the
possible exception of those with very rich parents, study more than
they would in laissez fare;
(ii) either no school-age child does any paid work, in which case
children with poor parents do more unpaid work than children with
rich ones, or children with poor parents do more unpaid work than
children with poor ones;
(iii) the government uses a net subsidy decreasing in parental in-
come, and a net tax increasing in the skill premium, to redistribute
and insure, and will thereby relax the credit constraints of all but the
richest parents, but will not achieve perfect equity, full insurance,
and perfect consumption smoothing.
In most countries, primary school enrollment is compulsory, and (at least
o¢ cially) children up to a certain age are not allowed to work. In many de-
veloping countries, however, ￿ (:) is not available. If education is subsidized at
all in period 1, it is through p. Is that better or worse than laissez faire? We
will answer this question in two steps. First, starting from laissez faire, would
the imposition of school enrollment raise social welfare? The answer is no. The
policy would lower social welfare, because it would oblige all parents, including
those who will not send their children to school anyway, to pay p. Forbidding
child labour would reduce welfare even further, because the ban would apply
only to overt child labour, and thus distort time allocation. Second, given com-
pulsory education, and with or without a ban on child labour, would a price
subsidy raise welfare? The answer depends on how the subsidy is ￿nanced. If
it is ￿nanced by a poll tax, the policy will have no e⁄ect, because parents will
e⁄ectively take a lump-sum subsidy with one hand, and pay a lump-sum tax of
the same amount with the other. If the price subsidy is ￿nanced by a tax on
parental income, by contrast, we get something that looks almost like our ￿ (:).
Not quite like it, because the subsidy cannot be larger than the average total
cost of tuition, and that may not be enough for a second best.
5 Extensions and some evidence
So far, we have assumed that the returns to educational investments are i.i.d.,
thereby implying that the uncertainty surrounding xi arises entirely from im-
perfect information about i￿ s learning ability, or the timing of the job o⁄ers that
i will receive after leaving school. What di⁄erence would it make if informa-
tion about the state of the labour market, or of the economy generally, were
12imperfect too, and the returns to educational investments were thus subject to
aggregate, as well as idiosyncratic shocks? As aggregate risks cannot be insured
by redistributing among parents, the government should use its ability to bor-
row and lend, not only to relax the credit constraints faced by parents, but also
to stabilize the expected return to education across generations (i.e., replace the
constraint that taxes and subsidies must be matched for each generation, with
the one that they must be matched over an in￿nite time horizon).
We have also assumed non-increasing absolute risk aversion. That is con-
sistent with evidence of diminishing absolute risk aversion in an educational
context is reported in Kodde (1986). Our prediction that, in the absence of
perfect credit and insurance market, and short of government intervention, ed-
ucational investment increases with parental income is consistent with the em-
pirical ￿ndings of Jacoby (1994). Our result, that the second-best policy raises
the aggregate demand for education, not only because it relaxes the credit con-
straint on educational investment for the average family, but also because it
makes the return to this investment less uncertain, is consistent with evidence
in Johnson (1987).
The empirical literature has paid a certain amount of attention also to the
role of children as a form of insurance in the face of parental income uncertainty
(as against uncertainty about the return to education). Beegle et al. (2007)
report that, in the absence of formal credit and insurance facilities, parents
respond to a downturn in their own income by making their children work
more. Fitzsimons (2007), by contrast, ￿nds that parents respond in this way
to a downturn in village aggregate income, but not to a downturn in their own
income. Our model can be extended to accommodate this type of uncertainty
by treating parental income as a random variable with known density. As the
density in question is not conditional on any action undertaken by the parents
(or, rather, assuming this to be the case, as in the reference literature), however,
the implications can be intuited without formal analysis.
If income shocks are purely idiosyncratic, they can be neutralized by mu-
tual insurance arrangements at the local (say, village) level. The results are
then unchanged. If income shocks have also an aggregate, village-level com-
ponent, parents will respond in the way estimated by Fitzsimons. The policy
prescription will then change, but only in a matter of interpretation, namely
that ￿ (:) now has the additional role of insuring parents against village-level
risks. Something similar may be said if the aggregate shocks are country-wide,
rather than village-level. The government must then borrow or lend, not only
to relax individual credit constraints, and redistribute within cohorts, but also
(as in the case where the shocks a⁄ect the return to educational investment) to
redistribute between cohorts.
6 Conclusion
In laissez faire, if parents can neither borrow nor insure, educational investment
is ine¢ ciently low. If parental income falls below a certain threshold, the child
13will not even enroll at school. Above that threshold, study time will increase
with parental income. That is consistent with the available evidence. As already
established in the theoretical literature, and con￿rmed by the empirical one,
parents will underinvest in their children￿ s education not only if they cannot
borrow against the expected return, but also if they cannot insure against the
risk of a low return.
The government can relax the credit constraint by e⁄ectively giving parents
an advance on the expected return of their educational investments, and make
this return less uncertain by redistributing from rich (lucky) to poor (unlucky)
children. In the light of evidence of diminishing absolute risk aversion in the
present context, reducing uncertainty would reduce also inequality among par-
ents. This inequality can be further reduced by redistributing from rich to poor
parents. If we extend the model to allow for parental income to be uncertain,
redistributing from rich to poor parents also would serve as insurance.
In ￿rst best (i.e., if the government costlessly observes all parental decisions),
all parents will enroll their children at school, and invest in their education at
the e¢ cient level. As children are ex-ante identical, they all study for the same
amount of time. But there is nothing to indicate that they will study full time.
In a poor country, it may well be e¢ cient for school-age children to do a certain
amount of non-harmful work. The policy uses personalized lump-sum transfers
to achieve perfect equity, full insurance, and perfect consumption-smoothing.
In second best (de￿ned here to mean that the government observes only
the children￿ s enrollment status, and the amount of work they do overtly in the
market), school enrollment is compulsory, and there is a legal ceiling, decreasing
in parental income, on the amount of overt work a school-age child is allowed
to do. The government again redistributes across parents, and across children,
but does not achieve perfect equity, full insurance, and perfect consumption-
smoothing, because it uses distortionary policy instruments. These include a
￿ at-rate education grant, and a scholarship increasing in the ￿nal school result.
Overt child labour is not taxed, and the price of school enrollment is not sub-
sidized. But school enrollment is compulsory, and there is a legal ceiling, non
decreasing in parental income, on the overt child labour. Most children study
more than in laissez faire.
Although it abstracts from the worst forms child labour,13 our analysis refers
quite clearly to a poor developing country. It may thus be interesting to com-
pare our results with those of an analysis which relates quite clearly to a rich
developed one. Hanushek et al. (2003) use a calibrated general equilibrium
model to assess the welfare e⁄ects of a range of policy instruments under the
assumption that child labour is out of the question, risk considerations can be
ignored, and there is no moral hazard with regard to the amount of time a
child spends studying. The result is that education subsidies generally perform
less well than other forms of redistribution, and that a merit-based education
like ours is justi￿ed only in the presence of an education externality. These
di⁄erences highlight the importance of the stage of development.
13For an analysis encompassing these forms of child labour, see Dessy and Pallage (2005).
14It may also be interesting to compare our policy results with what is done in
practice. Primary school enrollment is compulsory, and labour at a very young
age forbidden (o¢ cially at least), in most countries. In poor developing ones,
however, education is subsidized, if at all, only through the price of school en-
rollment. We have argued that making enrollment compulsory, without o⁄ering
any kind of subsidy, in a situation where parents can neither borrow, nor buy
insurance, would push social welfare below the laissez-faire level, and that for-
bidding child labour on top of it would make things even worse. Starting from
a situation where school enrollment is compulsory, however, the introduction
of a price subsidy would have no e⁄ect if this were ￿nanced by a poll-tax, but
would raise educational investment and social welfare if it were ￿nanced by a
tax increasing in parental income. Either, the e⁄ect would not be as large as
that of our policy, because the subsidy could not exceed the cost of tuition, and
that might not be enough for a second best.
References
Baland, J. M. and J. A. Robinson (2000), Is Child Labor Ine¢ cient? Journal
of Political Economy 108, 663-679
Cigno, A. (2006), A Constitutional Theory of the Family, Journal of Popu-
lation Economics 19, 259-283
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(2009), Agency in Family Policy: A Survey, CESifo Working Paper
2664
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿and F. C. Rosati (2005), The Economics of Child Labour, New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press
Beegle, K., Dehejia, R. H., Gatti, R. (2007), Child Labour, Income Shocks,
and Access to Credit, Journal of Development Economics, forth.
Dessy, S. E. and S. Pallage (2005), A Theory of the Worst Forms of Child
Labor, Journal of Development Economics 115, 68-87
Fitzsimons E. (2007), The E⁄ects of Risk on Education in Indonesia, Eco-
nomic Development and Cultural Change 56, 1￿ 25
Hanushek, E. A., C. K. Y. Leung, and K. Y. I. Yilmaz (2003), Redistribu-
tion Through Education and Other Transfer Mechanisms, Journal of Monetary
Economics 50, 1719-50
Jacoby, H. (1994), Borrowing Constraints and Progress Through School:
Evidence from Peru, Review of Economics and Statistics LXXVI, 151-160
Johnson, W. R. (1987), Income Redistribution as Human Capital Insurance,
Journal of Human Resources 22, 269-280
Kodde, A. D. (1986), Uncertainty and the Demand for Education, Review
of Economics and Statistics 68, 460-467
Levhari D. and Y. Weiss (1974), The E⁄ect of Risk on the Investment in
Human Capital, American Economic Review 64, 950-963
Loury, G. (1981), Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earn-
ings, Econometrica 49, 843-67
Pouliot, W. (2006), Introducing Uncertainty in Baland and Robinson￿ s Model
of Child Labour, Journal of Development Economics 79, 264-272
15Ranjan, P. (2001), Credit Constraints and the Phenomenon of Child Labor,
Journal of Development Economics 64, 81-102
Razin, A. (1976), Lifetime Uncertainty, Human capital and Physical Capital,
Economic Enquiry 14, 439-448
16